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Increasingly, firms are leveraging external knowledge sources for key technological 
components in creating innovations. However, use of external sources raises concerns about 
appropriability of technology for the firm i.e. is the firm able to get the required technical 
knowledge from the external sources. To address this concern firms choose appropriate 
governance mechanism for their technology collaboration with the objective to reduce the 
transaction cost associated with the technology collaboration. One reason for transaction cost 
to arise in technology collaborations is related to the nature of the innovation being 
developed. Using the framework of Thompson’s classification of organizational technology, 
the paper conceptualises the types of innovation as either mediating, long linked or intensive. 
Based on the typology of innovation, the paper analyses the appropriability issues that would 
arise when collaboration with external sources are used for creating the innovation and 
thereby propose what governance mechanism would be appropriate to address the issues of 
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As markets for technology have grown over the years (Arora, Fosfuri and Gamberdella, 
2001), the use of external sources of technology in innovation is becoming more prevalent. A 
study by Linder, Jarvenpaa & Davenport (2003) have found that an average of 45% of 
innovations came from external sources. The reason for this is that firms may not have the 
capability associated with the development and production of key technological components 
(Leiblein & Miller, 2003; Hoetker, 2005). Most managers now accept that “even the most 
capable R&D organization must leverage external knowledge sources as a core process in 
innovation”. (Chesbrough, 2006:1). 
 
However this new emphasis on using external sources goes against the conventional wisdom 
of emphasising internal sourcing of core technology due to concerns of horizontal and 
vertical appropriability (McEvily, Eisenhardt & Prescott, 2004). So how do firms resolve this 
dilemma of appropriabiltiy while agreeing to join hands with external sources in developing 
technology? According to transaction cost economics (TCE), technology collaboration 
transactions differ along three critical dimensions of asset specificity, behavioural 
uncertainty, and market uncertainty (Robertson & Gatignon, 1998), and these influence the 
choice of different collaborative arrangements depending on whether the technology 
development is at the pre-competitive stage or at the competitive stage (Chesnias, 1988). This 
raises an important issue for firms- to address their concerns of appropriability arising from 
technology collaboration with external sources; firms need to choose the appropriate 
governance mechanism.  
 
The question arises whether firms able to choose the appropriate governance mechanism to 
address their concerns of appropriability while entering into technology collaboration with 
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external sources. Studies by McKinsey and Coopers & Lybrand suggest seven out of 10 R&D 
collaborations fail to meet the expectations and had to be dissolved (Achrol, Scheer & Stern, 
1989) which points out that potential benefits of technology collaboration have not been 
received by the firms, and one of the reasons for this has been the issue of appropriability 
(Levin et al, 1987).  Thus, a real and important concern for technology managers is what 
would be the appropriate governance mechanism to address the concerns of appropriability 
arising in the technology collaboration with external sources? The extant literature had 
identified that the knowledge characteristics (degree of social/ technical complexity, resource 
or context specificity, tacit or codified, etc.) of the new technology underlying an innovation 
impacts appropriability (Kogut & Zander, 1992; Reed & DeFillipi, 1990). Therefore, a moot 
question is what would be the appropriate collaboration arrangements for managing 
relationship with external sources being used for developing innovations. To answer this 
question, the paper uses the organizational technology framework of Thompson (1967) to 
conceptualise the nature of innovations being developed through leveraging of external 
sources and the appropriability issues that arise therein. Based on this conceptualization 
appropriate governance mechanism to manage the collaboration more effectively are 
proposed.   
 
 
CONCEPTUALIZATION OF INNOVATION 
 
James D. Thompson (1967) had developed a view of technology based on task 
interdependence i.e. the manner in which organizational tasks are related to one another. 
According to Thompson’s classification there are three types of technology – mediating, long 
linked and intensive.  
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Mediating technology is based on pooled task interdependence. Organizations using 
mediating technology would have organizational tasks being carried out independently and 
each task’s performance contributing separately to the performance of the whole 
organization. Thus, here the task interdependence is quite low as performance of a task does 
not require direct reliance on other tasks.  
 
Lets consider a situation where an innovation being created in similar to the characteristics of 
mediating technology. This would mean that different technological components, each 
independently developed, are coordinated together to create the innovation. An example of 
this type of innovation is the creation of the personal computer. For creating the personal 
computer different technological components like drive, display, memory, motherboard, etc. 
are pooled together. Each of these technological components has their separate technological 
trajectories with little interaction with the development of the other technological components 
being used. For example, the technological development of display devices from CRT to 
LCD is independent of the technological development taking place in drives or memory. 
Thus LCD display based personal computers can exist side by side with CRT display based 
personal computers with each exhibiting differing levels of performance (in resolution and 
display) for the user.  
 
What are the implications of creating such innovations when the firm wants to collaborate 
with external sources for different technical components to be required in the innovation? As 
the technological development of different components would be independent and not linked 
to the need of the specific innovation in which the component is to be used, the developer of 
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the technical component would not have make investments in technology development that 
are specific to the requirements of the collaboration. Thus in such circumstances, the 
transactions between the collaborators would be characterised by low “asset specificity” 
(Williamson, 1991), as investments can be redeployed to alternative uses, and external 
sources participating in the collaboration are less liable to be held to ransom by the firm 
creating the innovation. Also, as the nature of interdependence with other technical 
components involved in the innovation being low, developer of technical components would 
not have to share core technology information with other collaborators thereby reducing the 
uncertainty involved with opportunistic behaviour of collaborating partners to appropriate 
technical knowledge. Overall, the transactions between the firm and the external sources 
would be characterised by low uncertainty with each knowing what is expected from the 
other. As the performance of the innovation is dependent on the performance of the 
component, the relationship with the external source would be driven primarily by technical 
requirements with relatively less ambiguity.   
 
Proposition1: When innovation, characterised by mediating technology type is sought to be 
developed through collaboration with external sources, the most effective governance 
mechanism would be the one that is based on arms-length interaction between the 
collaborating partners.    
 
Long linked technology 
 
Long–linked technology involves sequential interdependence between tasks whereby the 
output of the preceding task becomes the input for the succeeding task. Thus the performance 
of the succeeding task depends on the performance of the preceding task and cannot be 
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performed before the preceding task is completed. Therefore there is need to manage 
coordination between the sequential tasks for effective development of the final output in 
long-linked technology. 
 
Thus when the creation of an innovation is based on the characteristics of long-linked 
technology, technical knowledge developed in the preceding stage of the innovation would be 
used for developing technical knowledge in the succeeding stage and the outcome of 
innovation is dependent on the effectiveness of technology development at each stage. 
Innovation in pharmaceutical or chemical field could be classified as similar to long-linked 
technology type. For example, creating a new drug starts by seeking new chemical 
compounds which have the potential solve health problems. If the discovery phase yields 
promising compounds, attempt is made to develop a safe and effective product by screening 
from the promising compounds. Then the screened product is tested on infected laboratory 
animals. If the product is found to have no harmful effects then it is subjected to clinical trial 
on humans. If the trials are successful, the drug is then tested on patients before approval is 
granted.  (Pisano, 1994). Thus technology development here involves multiple stages where 
preceding stage’s output becomes the input for the next stage and effectiveness of the final 
output (drug) is dependent on performance of the various stages.  
 
As long as these stages of the vertical chain are located within the same firm, the issue of 
coordination does not present a major problem as, according to TCE theory (Williamson, 
1985), the uncertainty that encompass the transaction between the stages have been resolved 
by the choice of the governance mode of vertical integration whereby the decisions regarding 
the stages are brought with the decision scope of one firm. 
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However, the question arises how the coordination is achieved when the stages are located 
within different firms. Under such circumstances the issue of uncertainty in the transaction 
between the stages cannot be wished away. Lets take the example where the upstream stage 
(U), being managed by firm A, produces technical knowledge to be used by downstream 
stage (D), being managed by firm B. For effective development of the final technology, both 
the stages need to be developed effectively. For this it is essential for stage D to have full 
information about technology from stage U and thus firm A needs to share adequate technical 
information with firm B. However, sharing full technical information could be risky for A if 
B decides to act opportunistically and walk out of the transaction after getting full 
information. Also as the stages are sequentially interlinked, effective development of stage D 
might require firm B to develop capability to integrate technical knowledge being produced 
from stage U. This would require firm B to make investments that could be specific to 
receive the technical knowledge of stage U.  However, this poses risk to firm B as 
opportunistic behaviour by firm A in not transferring output of stage U would make the 
redeployment of investments made by firm B difficult, leading to increased “asset 
specificity” (Williamson, 1991). These uncertainties surrounding the transaction would 
prevent firms A and B from entering into technical collaboration with each other.  
 
According to TCE, the solution to the above problem lies in adopting governance 
mechanisms between the firms that is able to address the uncertainty arising from the 
transaction. As evident from the above discussion, the uncertainty arises from the fact that 
there is no penalty for opportunistic behaviour by one party against the other which means 
that risk is being borne by one party while rewards would be shared jointly. This risk return 
profile makes it less favourable for a firm to enter into collaboration with other for creating 
innovation similar to long-linked technology type. Thus for the collaboration to be effective it 
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is essential that the governance mechanism should ensure there is assurance for either party 
that they would not be adversely affected in case of opportunistic behaviour by the partner. 
This is possible when participants are made to pre-commit stakes in the transaction that they 
might loose of opportunistic behaviour. This is akin to bank mortgaging assets against loans 
to prevent wilful default of loan repayment. This would ensure that participant in the 
collaboration have greater commitment to the transaction while assuring the other party that 
chance of opportunistic behaviour is reduced. 
 
Proposition 2: When innovation, characterised by long-linked technology type is sought to be 
developed through collaboration with external sources, the transaction between the 
collaborators when governed by reciprocal commitment would lead to increased 




Intensive technology involves reciprocal interdependence between the various tasks such that 
performance of one task is dependent on the performance of the other tasks and vice versa. 
Organizations using intensive technology would need to select, combine and apply tasks 
based on the feedback received from the output produced (Thompson, 1967: 17).  Thus the 
overall output of intensive technology would depend on the nature of coordination achieved 
between the tasks.  
 
When the process of creating innovation is based on intensive technology logic, different 
technical components of the innovation would need to be combined and integrated taking into 
consideration their reciprocal interaction. Process of creating innovation in the information 
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technology industry would be similar to intensive technology type. For example the creation 
of software requires integration of different technological components- operating system, 
hardware, software language and user needs. Necessity to support certain user needs (like 
graphics) would require using a particular language (object oriented) that supports the 
functionality and which in turn might have an impact on requirement of operating system. So 
using any component independently without integrating the technical knowledge with the 
other components would not lead to improvement in the final performance of the innovation. 
Similarly in DRAM manufacturing, component technologies (mask, resist and alignment 
equipment) need to integrate for new generation commercialization. Evidence from DRAM 
manufacturing suggests that when the component technologies do not progress uniformly it 
gives rise to technological bottlenecks (Kapoor & Adner, 2007). Therefore the development 
of intensive technology would require focus on the coordination between the developments of 
various technical components involved in the overall technology development. 
 
The coordination between the different technical tasks involved in creating the innovation is 
easier when the different technical tasks are carried out within the same organization as it is 
possible to synchronise the development in one component technology with the other.  
However, the problem of coordination would arise when the different technical tasks of the 
innovation are to be carried out by different firms say firms A, B and C who have to 
collaborate. Under such circumstances, it is necessary for firm A to know the nature of 
technical development of other collaborators (B and C) as it would then determine what 
efforts firm A it would make to synchronise its technical development with those of firms B 
and C.. However, the information flow between different technical components is not perfect 
due to the tasks being performed in different firms. This uncertainty would make firm A not 
advance its required technical development unless there is commitment from firms B and C 
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to develop their technical components,  as firm A feels that technology development 
unilaterally would lead to increase in risk of asset specificity. This uncertainty regarding 
other collaborator’s commitment makes a firm to minimise its efforts in technology 
development. As a consequence of this, other participants would see this act as free riding 
problem leading to a domino effect whereby every participant would behave likewise. This 
would lead to each participant in the collaboration (firms A, B and C) not contributing as 
required for the innovation creation thereby affecting the creation of the innovation. Unless 
this uncertainty is resolved, participants would be unwilling to participate in the collaboration 
as they might find their investments sunk. These uncertainties surrounding the transaction 
would prevent firms from entering into technical collaboration with each other for creating 
innovation of the intensive technology type.  
 
As evident from the above, the uncertainty in this transaction arises from the fact that the 
tasks of firm A is going to be affected by the tasks of the firms B and C as their relationship 
is reciprocal but firm A has no control to influence how firm B or C would act. This prevents 
adequate commitment of the participant in the collaboration. This uncertainty could be 
reduced if the collaborator is able to influence the behaviour of other collaborators. This is 
possible when the participants in the collaboration get into specific terms of understanding 
with each other so that one can predict beforehand the behaviour of others in the 
collaboration and thus modify one’s act accordingly.   
 
Proposition 3 When innovation, characterised by intensive technology type is sought to be 
developed through collaboration with external sources, the transaction between the 
collaborators when governed by specific commitment would lead to increased effectiveness of 
collaboration.     
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With the expansion of technical knowledge domain it has become necessary for firms to 
collaborate with external sources to keep themselves abreast at the frontiers of technical 
development. In that regard, firms would be interested to develop long lasting and fruitful 
collaborative relationships with external sources. The above discussion provides 
organizations with possibilities of organizing their collaborative relationships with external 
sources according to the nature of innovation sought to be developed so that the outcome is 
more fruitful. The existing literature had looked at the issue of collaboration in technology as 
options between vertical integration or alliances based on concerns of appropriability. 
However, in the present context with increasing likelihood of technological obsolescence 
firms may be dissuaded from vertical integration (Balakrishnan & Wernerfelt, 1986), and 
thus the issue of technology collaboration becomes a necessity rather than a choice. In such 
situation the question is which type of alliance would be better to protect appropriability. The 
discussion in this paper provides the theoretical perspective to address this issue more 
effectively. The discussion of the paper may also help to explain why there are industry 
specific practices to protect technological appropriability e.g. use of patents widespread in 
pharmaceutical industry but not so in other industries, which could be explained by the way 
innovation is created in different industries. Being a conceptual study, the findings are in the 
nature of propositions that provide a basis for future researchers to direct further research to 
test the various hypotheses regarding governance mechanisms and the nature of technology 
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